Acta Comportamentalia

Relating relations as a functional-analytic model of analogy and metaphor

En el presente trabajo se presenta un modelo analítico-funcional de la analogía y la metáfora, que ha venido desarrollándose durante los últimos quince años, con base en el comportamiento de relacionar relaciones. Primeramente, se señalan las características principales del razonamiento analógico así como se describen las limitaciones del enfoque cognitivo. Posteriormente, se expone la comprensión skinneriana de la metáfora como antecedente del modelo mencionado. A esto le sigue la descripción del fenómeno de la equivalencia estimular y el paradigma experimental de la analogía basado en la respuesta de equivalencia-equivalencia. Se expone la Teoría del Marco Relacional como marco teórico con el que interpretar los resultados de los estudios que han utilizado dicho paradigma y se expone su concepción de la analogía y la metáfora. Finalmente, se revisa la evidencia empírica acumulada en más de una veintena de estudios. De ellos se desprende que el modelo cuenta con una definición precisa y funcional de analogía y metáfora, una formulación de cómo surge este repertorio relacional, los procedimientos experimentales tienen una validez externa importante y que han servido para modelar algunos aspectos esenciales de la analogía así como analizar algunos factores implicados en su derivación y calidad.

The current study presents a functional-analytic model of analogy and metaphor that has been developed during the last fifteen years. The basis of this model is represented by the behavior of relating relations. The characteristics of analogical reasoning are described first emphasizing its central role in understanding human language and cognition. Subsequently, the characteristics and limitations of the cognitive approach to analogical reasoning are briefly described and emphasizing the importance of having a precise definition of analogy and specifying the interactions responsible for its development. Then, the skinnerian approach to metaphor based on the extended tact is described and its role as precursor of the functional-analytic model based on relational responding is recognized. The exposition of this latter model is initiated describing the phenomenon of equivalence stimulus and the experimental paradigm of analogy based on equivalenceequivalence responding. Relational Frame Theory (RFT) is described then as a theoretical approach that facilitates the interpretation of the results that emerge from this experimental paradigm. RFT is a behavior analytic approach to human language and cognition. The main idea behind RFT is that relating stimuli under arbitrary contextual control (i.e., to relate stimuli that do not share formal properties) is a type of generalized operant that is learned through multiple exemplar training. RFT proposes the existence of different types of relations among stimuli or relational frames such as coordination, distinction, opposition, comparison, hierarchy, etc. Every relational frame has three properties: mutual entailment, combinatorial entailment and transformation of functions. From an RFT point of view, analogy involves the establishment of a relation of coordination among common types of trained or derived relations. Metaphor would also involve the establishment of a relation of coordination but, in this case, among two separate relational networks that share some property. Another difference proposed between analogy and metaphor is that analogy is bidirectional but metaphor is unidirectional. To finish with this exposition, some characteristics of the transformation of functions through analogical relations are analyzed. Finally, the empirical evidence based on more than twenty studies is reviewed. In conclusion, the RFT approach has a precise and functional definition of analogy and metaphor and establishes what interactions are responsible for their development. The experimental paradigm based on equivalence-equivalence responding, and other type of procedures also used, has shown relevant data about its external validity. It also has served to model some of the most important characteristics of analogy and to analyze some factors involved in the derivation and quality judgments of analogy. These data show that the RFT approach to analogy and metaphor is promising, but it is recognized that the research on this topic is only in its beginnings.

Analogies, metaphors and cognitions: comments from Ruiz and Luciano's article

Discute-se brevemente quatro pontos identificados no artigo de Ruiz e Luciano sobre analogias, metáforas e cognições: (a) o avanço propiciado pela pesquisa sobre o responder relacional derivado à compreensão da cognição humana, (b) a relevância desse programa de pesquisas para o futuro da análise do comportamento humano complexo, (c) a centralidade de analogias e metáforas para uma compreensão comportamental da cognição e (d) a Teoria dos Quadros Relacionais (RFT - Relational Frame Theory) como modelo para a investigação e interpretação da cognição na Análise do Comportamento. Argumenta-se que os dois primeiros pontos sintetizam importantes contribuições do artigo e independem das alegações que caracterizam os dois últimos, consideradas controversas e limitadoras da pesquisa comportamental da cognição.

Four topics discussed by Ruiz and Luciano, in their paper on analogies, metaphors and cognitions, are briefly commented on here: the progress represented by research on derived relational responding, to an understanding of human cognition; (b) the relevance of such a program to the future of behavior analysis of complex human behavior; (c) the central role of analogies and metaphors to a behavioral understanding of cognition; and (d) the Relational Frame Theory (RFT) as a model for research and interpretation of cognition in Behavior Analysis. It is argued that topics 1 and 2 summarize the paper's important contributions, and do not depend on the statements found in topics 3 and 4, which are taken as controversial and restrictive of behavioral research on cognition.

On the analog behavior. Commentary on Luciano and Ruiz' article: link relations as an analytical-functional model of analogy and metaphor

Se ofrece un análisis crítico del modelo analítico-funcional de la analogía propuesto por Ruíz y Luciano, concluyendo que el logro experimental de las analogías puede hacerse sin usar las categorías de la Teoría de los Marcos Relacionales (TMR), ya sea porque no se necesitan o porque no aplican. Cuando se analiza el tipo de resultados conductuales logrados en los experimentos tradicionales, se observa que se trata de una redundancia operacional de la definición de analogía, que captura sólo el formato relacional de la misma, pero que se escapan características que parecen ser definitorias, como puede ser la abstracción categorial y/o conceptual de las propiedades y relaciones que las articulan. Se sugiere al final un esbozo de un paradigma que podría dar luces para enriquecer el trabajo adelantado.

A critical analysis of the functional-analytic model of analogy proposed by Ruiz and Luciano is provided, concluding that the experimental achievement of analogies can be made without using the Relational Frame Theory (RFT) categories, either because they are not needed or because they don't apply. When analyzing the type of behavioral results achieved in traditional experiments, they could be interpreted as operational redundancies of the analogy definition, which captures only its relational format, but not some possible defining features as the categorical and/or conceptual abstraction of the properties and relations that articulate it. It is suggested the outline of a paradigm that could shed light to enrich the work ahead.

On the relevance of the analogy and Relational Frame Theory in understanding human cognition. Reply to comment by E. Z. Tourinho

Learning history as a part of context: Response to R. Pérez-Almonacid commentary

The behavioral analysis of human thinking

Se revisa el estatus conceptual y experimental del análisis conductista del pensamiento humano. Se hace un análisis crítico del estado del arte principalmente dentro del Análisis de la Conducta, planteando que entre sus problemas se encuentra el basarse en categorías propias para relaciones asociativas, forzándolas para dar cuenta de aquello que las rebasa, en plantearse como objetivos científicos sólo la predicción y el control, y en confundir la complejidad cualitativa con la cuantitativa. Finalmente, se esboza una alternativa conductual basada en una concepción molar, que reconoce contingencias convencionales mediadas por respuestas lingüísticas, que considera como fundamental trascender el abordaje asociativo para su establecimiento y que defiende objetivos científicos distintos a los de la predicción y el control.

The conceptual and experimental status of behaviorist analysis of human thinking is reviewed. A critical analysis is made about its state of art within the Behavior Analysis, proposing that among its problems is to be based on categories appropriated to associative relationships, forcing them for explain which it exceeds, proposing as only scientific goals the prediction and control, and to confuse qualitative complexity with quantitative one. Finally, a behavioral alternative is outlined, based on a molar conception that recognizes conventional contingencies mediated by linguistic responses, that regards as essential to transcend the associative approach for establishing it, and defends other scientific goals different to prediction and control.

Comments to R. Pérez Almonacid's article: The analysis of human thinking

Thinking as complex human behavior-commentary on Pérez-Almonacid's article

O texto discute a análise oferecida por Perez-Almonacid para o pensamento enquanto comportamento humano complexo. Examinam-se algumas interpretações oferecidas para as proposições de Skinner e as implicações de uma proposta alternativa, de análise molar do comportamento. Destaca-se que um ponto chave a ser considerado diz respeito às (novas) unidades de análise admitidas como pertinentes a uma ciência do comportamento e aponta-se que a descrição de tais unidades ainda requer um esforço analítico. Tal descrição pode ser compatível com as contribuições de Skinner, distinguindo-se seu modelo explicativo (mais amplo) de seu programa de investigações empírico-experimentais (mais circunscrito a certas classes de fenômenos).

This paper discusses Perez-Almonacid's analysis concerning thinking as complex human behavior. It begins examining the interpretations offered to some of Skinner's ideas, and the implications of an alternative view, one of molar analysis of behavior. A key issue pointed out refers to the (new) units of analysis acknowledged as appropriate to a science of behavior. It is argued that the description of such units of analsys still requires an analytical effort. The description may show compatible to Skinner's contributions, as one distinguishes his (broader) explanatory system from his empirical-experimental research program (more restricted to some classes of phenomena).

Scientific goals, sufficiency and categorical coherence: response to Ruiz and Luciano's commentary

Unit of analysis, experimentation and explanation: response to Tourinho's commentary: o pensar como comportamento humano complex

Thinking: Social behavior and cultural practices

O artigo discute o comportamento de pensar, sob a ótica da Análise do Comportamento. Iniciando com a refutação do individualismo epistemológico cartesiano, o artigo sugere que não apenas o dualismo deve ser rejeitado, mas também que os fenômenos cognitivos devem ser reconhecidos como compreendendo relações do indivíduo com seu ambiente. O conceito de eventos privados é introduzido para salientar que tende a desviar a atenção de relações comportamentais, ao mesmo tempo em que pode ser útil para indicar que certas contingências culturais promovem um responder de observabilidade restrita, que pode ser parte das redes de relações que definem as cognições. Tais redes são então discutidas considerando-se a centralidade do comportamento verbal e os possíveis componentes culturais. Aponta-se que os recursos conceituais e metodológicos necessários para a identificação dessas relações ainda encontram-se em desenvolvimento. Apoiando-se nas proposições de Glenn para o estudo da seleção cultural, sugere-se que tais recursos contemplem a consideração de metacontingências, de modo a explicar circunstâncias em que o pensar compreende relações que são o produto da seleção nesse nível.

The paper discusses the behavior of "thinking", from the standpoint of Behavior Analysis. Begining with the refutation of Cartesian individualistic epistemology, it suggests not only that dualism should be rejected, but also that cognitive phenomena should be acknowledged as comprising relationships between an individual and his/her environment. The concept of private events is introduced to assert that it tends to distract from behavioral relations, while it may also be useful to stress come cultural contingencies that promote responding with reduced observability, which may be part of a network of relationships that define cognitions. Such networks are discussed in the light of the central role played by verbal behavior, and possible cultural components. It is pointed out that the needed conceptual and methodological resources to identify those relations are under development. Based on Glenn's assertions concerning the study of cultural selection, it is suggested that those resources should comprise the approach of metacontingencies, in order to explain the circumstances under which thinking comprises relations that have been selected in that level.

The intersection between culture and the analysis of thinking as behavior: Tourinho commentary to Tourinho's article, O pensar: comportamento social e práticas culturais

Se revisa la tesis de Tourinho sobre la posibilidad de que el análisis del pensar, entendido como descripción y explicación de propiedades, objetos y eventos, se enriquezca con las categorías desarrolladas por Glenn (2004) para el estudio de la selección cultural. Se presentan cuatro argumentos suyos: la necesidad de un enfoque relacional del comportamiento, la ubicación de respuestas de observabilidad limitada en el contexto de la relación comportamental, el carácter verbal y social del pensar y la comprensibilidad y plausibilidad de que las macro y metacontingencias aporten a la explicación del pensar. Se señalan las coincidencias en el carácter relacional del pensar así como de su naturaleza verbal y social, pero se discrepa en la vinculación que se hace con las categorías de la selección cultural, pues se sostiene que aportaría a un análisis de contenido y no de proceso, y porque no permite cualificar las formas ontogenéticas más complejas de conducta.

Tourinho's thesis on the possibility that the analysis of thinking, understood as description and explanation of properties, objects and events, be enriched with the categories developed by Glenn for to study the cultural selection (2004), is reviewed. His arguments are four: the need for a relational approach to behavior, the location of limited observability responses under context of behavioral interaction, the verbal and social nature of thinking, and the comprehensibility and plausibility of meta and macrocontingencies for explanation of thinking. The similarities are pointed out, such as the relational character of thinking and its verbal and social nature. But there is not agreement about the link to categories of cultural selection because, is argued, they contribute to a content analysis but not to a process one, and it does not allow qualify more complex ontogenetic forms of behavior.

Comments to E. Tourinho's article: "Comportamento social e práticas culturais"

Cultural dimensions of thinking: Reply to Pérez-Almonacid's commentary

The integration of research programs in the analysis of complex human behavior: response to comments from Ruiz