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Revista da Abordagem Gestáltica

versión impresa ISSN 1809-6867

Resumen

GOMES, William Barbosa. Distinction between technical and logical procedures on phenomenological analysis. Rev. abordagem gestalt. [online]. 2007, vol.13, n.2, pp.228-240. ISSN 1809-6867.

In 1986 I used a simple strategy to exercise phenomenological logic with undergraduate students. I asked them to describe how a good class in Psychology would be. The question was relevant due to the pedagogical instabilities of the time. The classical class structures were not tolerated, but it was not clear how to articulate liberal alternatives. The participants were students, with ages between 18 and 21 years old, five males and four females. Twenty years later, after I reviewed the data, I was impressed by the expressiveness strength of those testimonials, and the opportunity to differentiate some procedural aspects of the phenomenological analysis: the distinction between technique and logic. In this paper, I go through two ways of analysis to differentiate technical procedures (i.e. the stages of data organization) from logical procedures (i.e. the reflexive movement between the experience’s data and the consciousness’ act). First, I will follow Husserl and second Merleau-Ponty. I conclude that the explanation of methods and materials shall not be restricted to the technical and organizing procedures of analysis. It shall remark the articulation between the logics of located and appropriative intentionality.

Palabras clave : Phenomenological Technique; Phenomenological Logic; Radical Gestalt; Teaching; Learning.

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