ROSA, Márcia. Lacan and Plato’s and Ernest Jones’s mental weakness. Psicol. rev. (Belo Horizonte) []. 2008, 14, 2, pp.37-46. ISSN 1677-1168.

In 1972, the psychoanalyst Jacques Lacan interpreted Plato and, then, Ernest Jones as mentally weak. Such interpretations are unusual and even paradoxical. How can one speak about mental weakness in the case of the Greek philosopher, known exactly for his extensive and expressive theoretical production, and in the case of a well-known psychoanalyst, Freud’s biographer? What does ‘weakness’ mean in those two cases? After resuming each interpretation, this paper summarizes three of Lacan’s crucial formulations on the subject of mental weakness: as intellectual inhibition; as an incapacity to question the Other’s desire and, finally, as an incapacity to install oneself steadily in a discourse. With his formulations, Lacan rejects the conception of mental weakness as a cognitive deficit and defines it as a deficiency of language in dealing with jouissance.

: Lacan; Plato; Ernest Jones; Mental weakness.

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