LAZZERI, Filipe. Remarks on teleological behaviorism: part I. []. , 21, 2, pp.241-258. ISSN 0188-8145.

According to Rachlin's teleological behaviorism, ordinary psychological categories fulfill their central functions (viz. of explaining and predicting behavior) by designating molar patterns of overt behavior of the whole organism. This approach is discussed in the present work, which is divided up into two articles, and whose overall aim is to offer adding support for some of Rachlin's theses, but also to raise some objections to his account. That is to say, we attempt to distinguish, on the one hand, what is reasonably plausible in his account, and, on the other, what is worth being revised. The scope of the arguments (and objections) discussed in this first article concerns, in special, the mereology (or whole/part logic) of ordinary psychological categories, and the truth conditions of some of them. The remarks here presented draw upon some contributions provided by authors such as Wittgenstein, Bennett and Hacker, Ryle and Skinner.

: Psychological predications; Psychological categories; Behaviorism; Teleological behaviorism; Rachlin; Mentalism; Behavior; Molar perspective; Mereology.

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