TREVINO MONTEMAYOR, Rebeca. The present of the phenomenology in psychology. []. , 3, 2, pp.249-261. ISSN 1794-9998.

Phenomenology, as a philosophical project in Husserl’s view, opened a discussion which led it to be considered an unsuccessful project. Nevertheless, in methodological terms phenomenology is still a basic tool for comprehensive phenomenon in psychology. In this sense, the idea about phenomenological perception is an important contribution of Mearlau- Ponty’s work, who takes it from Gestaltpsycologie experiments, introducing an essential device to the understanding of the psychological phenomenon complexity, which is understood beyond the mere dual scientific relation known as subject-object. Lacan has made an important criticism to this thought, however Mearlau-Ponty’s position has still certain comprehensive possibilities in which we recognize the constitutive relation settle down between conscience and body, subject and world, between the self and the other; relations that make the phenomenology of perception an effort for an analysis of the subject. Bodyworld dialectics makes of the perceptive conscience a media in which the world is frequently recreated and reconstituted. This paper revitalizes the importance of phenomenology for psychology as a decisive topic to avoid the determinism of positive science and for understanding human-being in a wide spread world of possibilities.

: Phenomenology; Perception; Pscycotherapy; Psychological research; Conscience; Body.

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