RUDGE, Ana Maria. Presuppositions of the "new" criticism to psychoanalysis: freudian revisionism and the epistemology of psychoanalysis. Temas psicol. []. 2001, 9, 3, pp.179-186. ISSN 1413-389X.

The critiques to psychoanalysis from the movement called "Freudian revisionism", presupposes one particular conception of science that is derived from logical empiricism. In this tradition, the value of psychoanalysis is denied with the argument that it does not have the mechanisms of experimental verification or falsification like natural sciences. If the object of science is considered as a rational construction and not as data, however, the idea of continuity between different scientific fields or of a methodological unity does not apply. Each area of knowledge has its own parameters, and the different scientific fields or paradigms are incommensurable. From this point of view, it is advocated that psychoanalysis, as the theory of a clinical practice, must be evaluated by criteria that respect its epistemological specificity: the clinical effects of the psychoanalytic treatment, as well as the impacts of psychoanalysis in culture

: psychoanalysis; epistemology; revisionism; practice; science.

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