PERUZZO, Léo    STROPARO, Amanda Luiza. Cognitive Processes and Extended-Mind: a neofunctionalist metafhor?. Nat. hum. []. 2020, 22, 1, pp.34-49. ISSN 1517-2430.  https://doi.org/10.17648/2175-2834-v22n1-425.

This article intends to analyze how the extended mind hypothesis, on one hand, redraws the concept of cognitive processes based on a critique of physical/mental parallelism and, on the other hand, is grounded on functionalist arguments to consider other levels of the organism and the environment. With this purpose, initially, we indicate how the physical/mental dichotomy builds an epistemologically confused image, especially when considering the mental causation argument. The thesis that mental processes interfere with physical phenomena, or vice versa, is a legacy of the Cartesian tradition. Later, we argue that the concept of an extended mind does not adequately explain the use of artifacts, inferring an evolutionary prognosis in the human species. Finally, we identified some dilemmas - epistemological and moral - between the cognitive processes and proposals of Artificial Intelligence.

: Extended Mind; Cognition; Functionalism; Artificial Intelligence.

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