Resumo

PIMENTEL, Naiene dos Santos; BANDINI, Carmen Silvia Motta  e  MELO, Camila Muchon de. Understanding B. F. Skinner's abandonment of the "initiating self" through G. Ryle's critics to the traditional mentalism: theoretical issues and practical outcomes. Acta comport. [online]. 2012, vol.20, n.2, pp. 217-233. ISSN 0188-8145.

B. F. Skinner's and G. Ryle's philosophies, contrary to common sense and to the way that many philosophers and psychologists think, do not deny human subjectivity, consciousness and freedom. What Skinner's behaviorism and Ryle's philosophy do deny is the existence of an "inner self" initiating actions, or the existence of an immaterial mind governing human activities. This study aims to analyze the B. F. Skinner's abandonment of the "initiating self" through G. Ryle's critics to the traditional mentalism. As specific objectives we attempt to demonstrate that the concept of verbal behavior underlies notions of subjectivity, consciousness and freedom in Skinner's philosophy, on its own manner. We also seek to bring forward the possible practical outcomes regarding the Technology of Behavior based on abandoning the notion of "initiating self". In this sense, we first exhibit Ryle's proposition of mental concepts analysis, and after that we present Skinner's approach on private events, indicating the criticism regarding traditional mentalism from both authors. Finally, we indicate the practical outcomes concerning the Technology of Behavior, due to the abandoning of the "initiating self" notion in Skinner's theory.

Palavras-chave : B. F. Skinner; G. Ryle; initiating self; categorical transgression; private events; consciousness; technology of behavior.

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