Abstract

REIS, Róbson Ramos dos. The dissolution of the idea of logic. Nat. hum. [online]. 2003, vol.5, n.2, pp. 423-440. ISSN 1517-2430.

Based on the critical theses presented by Heidegger in texts which culminate in Was ist Metaphysik?, the present paper deals with the relation between Logic and Philosophy. It shows specifically that the polemic statement about the end of the primacy of Logic in Philosophy, founded on the thesis of the relation between negation and nothing, has as its critical target the so-called logical idealism of the Marburg School, and does not intend a general attack on formal Logic simpliciter. Taking in account the Kantian notion of "idea", Heidegger intended in the thesis of the dissolution of the idea of Logic a fundamental limitation for every ontological investigation grounded in logical-transcendental reflection, regardless of the way it can be improved, or reformulated. The question of nothing approached in Was ist Metaphysik? is analyzed here as a case that demonstrates the limits of the primacy of Logic in ontological questions.

Keywords : Heidegger; Ontology; Transcendental logic; Nothing.

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