Resumo

ARJA CASTANON, Gustavo. John Searle and the cognitivism. Ciênc. cogn. [online]. 2006, vol.8, pp. 096-109. ISSN 1806-5821.

Abstract The work of the North American John Searle is becoming one of the largest philosophical influences in the cognitivist approach of contemporary psychology, beginning to compete today even with the influence of the works of Jerry Fodor or Noam Chomsky. His largest role in cognitive sciences can be found in his help with the rescue of the concept of consciousness and in the attack to the theories of strong AI. This attack becomes separated in three fronts, one for each of the three central allegations of the computationalism. The first of these allegations would be that "the brain is a digital computer". The second, is that "the mind is a computational program". The third, is that "the operations of the brain can be simulated in a digital computer". This article presents Searle's critics over these theories, and also presents how their positions concerning the mind, in spite of recent, have already influenced the cognitivism, helping this movement to retake its original project of constituting itself as a psychology of consciousness. © Ciências & Cognição 2006; Vol. 08: 96-109.

Palavras-chave : John Searle; cognitivism; computationalism; consciousness; artificial intelligence.

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