Resumo

CASTANON, Gustavo Arja. The crisis of the computationalism: toward a new computational metaphor. Ciênc. cogn. [online]. 2006, vol.9, pp. 27-41. ISSN 1806-5821.

Abstract The theory of computationalism can be summarized in three central allegations, that "the brain is a digital computer", that "the mind is a computational program" and that "the operations of the brain can be simulated in a digital computer". Here, will be exposed the John Searle, Hubert Dreyfus, Peter Jackson, Thomas Nagel and Joseph Rychlak' refutations to these allegations. Because of the depth of these critics and their problems, was concluded that, as originally conceived by Hilary Putnam's Functionalism, the computationalism is overcome. In spite of this, here it will be exposed original theory that the power of the metaphor of the brain as computer can still be useful for the aid of human understanding on the mind and unyielding aspects of the consciousness, if we substitute the two levels of analysis brain/hardware and mind/software for the three levels brain/hardware, cognitive processes/software and consciousness/user. © Ciências & Cognição 2006; Vol. 09: xxx-xxx.

Palavras-chave : computational metaphor; computationalism; consciousness; artificial intelligence; philosophy of the mind..

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