Resumo

BOUYER, Gilbert Cardoso. The death of the representation in the philosophy and cognitive sciences. Ciênc. cogn. [online]. 2008, vol.13, n.1, pp. 21-46. ISSN 1806-5821.

Abstract This paper begins and ends with the facts that show how the sciences of cognition and the philosophy can to enlarge their horizon to encompass both embodied mind and lived human experience. Western scientific culture requires, in the philosophy and in the science, that we see bodies both a physical structures and as lived experiential structures. In the philosophy and in the sciences of cognition, there is an embodied-enactive approach that appears somewhat opaque. The term consists of two points: (1) perception consists in perceptually guided action and (2) cognitive structures emerge from the recurrent sensorimotor patterns that enable action to be perceptually guided. The hypothesis is that such minds do not operate by representation. Instead of representing an independent world of agent, they enact (enaction) a world as a domain of distinctions that is inseparable from the structure embodied by the cognitive system.

Palavras-chave : embodied mind; enaction; representation; action..

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