Abstract

TELES DA SILVEIRA, Ronie Alexsandro; JANCZURA, Gerson Américo  and  STEIN, Lilian Milnitsky. What is wrong with functional dissociation?. Ciênc. cogn. [online]. 2012, vol.17, n.2, pp. 40-50. ISSN 1806-5821.

The empiric dissociation has been used as an exclusive mechanism in obtaining of proposals for a functional architecture of human memory and mind. It is common postulating different memory systems in the cognitive extent (that is, functional dissociations) based upon empiric dissociations among results obtained in memory tasks, two general critics were observed: the lighter ones recognize the critics value, although they defend the maintenance of the strategy of proposing DFs because there is nothing that substitutes it. The more emphatic critics affirm that DFs are not defensible. Both critical postures challenge the empiric base of Cognitive Science and Neuropsychology, in the extent that they compromise the scientific project of obtaining a functional architecture for memory and mind. We have identified the main logical aspect of the fragility contained in the postulating mechanism of DFs: the inductive reasoning. Adopting Karl Popper's proposal of logic of production of scientific knowledge, we suggest a point of view that avoids the use of the induction and preserves DFs. © Cien. Cogn. 2012; Vol. 17 (2): 040-050.

Keywords : memory; functional dissociation; memory systems; cognitive architecture; deduction.

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