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Revista da Abordagem Gestáltica

versão impressa ISSN 1809-6867

Resumo

CASTRO, Thiago Gomes de  e  GOMES, William Barbosa. How do I know that I am myself?: kinesthesia and spatiality in the Husserlian Conferences of 1907 and in neurocognitive research. Rev. abordagem gestalt. [online]. 2011, vol.17, n.2, pp. 123-130. ISSN 1809-6867.

Husserl defined kinesthesia as the self-consciousness lived experience of movement and gesture, associated to the body unity, to the development of an extended ego schema, and to spatial perception. The study contrasts historical difficulties and recent collaborations between phenomenology and experimental research. The analysis is sustained in classical studies review on kinesthesia and perception, and in recent neurocognitive research, emphasizing implications to an understanding of intentionality. The concept of kinesthesia refers to two phenomenological issues: How do I know that I am myself, and who am I. The sense of self and actual action passes through the integration of reflective consciousness in motor action and perception, as confirmed by phenomenological and neurocognitive experiments using proprioceptive ambiguity contexts. Those studies are opening new possibilities to the rehabilitation of proprioceptive disorders - as in the case of amputees, self-image comorbidities and schizophrenia - and also to fruitful collaborations between phenomenology and cognitive neurosciences.

Palavras-chave : Kinesthesia; Selfconsciousness; Intentionality; Phenomenology; Neurocognition.

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