Abstract

KRETSCHEL, Verónica  and  OSSWALD, Andrés. The oblivion in Husserl's phenomenology. Two limit phenomena. Rev. abordagem gestalt. [online]. 2017, vol.23, n.3, pp. 317-325. ISSN 1809-6867.

The genetic perspective allows Husserl to enlarge the oblivion's theory developed in his early writes on time, gathered mainly in The Phenomenology of internal time-consciousness (1893-1917). Here we propose to analyze two phenomena: on the one hand, the influence of the associative synthesis in the recovery of unconscious representations obscured by virtue of the retentional modification process. This kind of oblivion, that characterizes the fully developed subjectivity, poses theoretically the possibility of remember all that has been forgotten. On the other hand, we try to explain the essential oblivion of the early childhood. In this sense, we suggest that the impossibility of remembering is due to the immaturity of trascendental structures. In other words, since the infant subjectivity is unable to constitute experience in a proper manner, then, is not possible to remember what has not been perceived stricto sensu.

Keywords : oblivion; remembering; genetic phenomenology; unconsciousness; early childhood.

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