Resumo

BEJARANO, Julio César Vargas. Transcendental phenomenlogy and scientia trascendens: two conceptions of the intentionality. Rev. abordagem gestalt. [online]. 2018, vol.24, n.spe, pp. 429-437. ISSN 1809-6867.  http://dx.doi.org/10.18065/RAG.2018v24ne.2.

This essay compares intentionality in Duns Scotus and Edmund Husserl. Such comparison allows to consider up to which point Scotus's philosophy, the scientia transcendens, enriches the phenomenological concept of intentionality and allows to determine whether such philosophy contains a "phenomenology of truth". It is shown that, despite some important convergencies respect of intentionality, Scotus and Husserl have two very different conceptions of the phaenomenon or the presence; for the first one, the intentional object is offered through the intelligible species, whereas for the second this is done through phaenomenization. This research shows that the main point of divergence is the conception of being: for Scotus, being and truth go together, independantly from intentional acts. For Husserl, the meaning of being arises from the intentional activity of the transcendental conscience, determined by intersubjective, worldly, temporal horizons. Finally, Scotus states questions of metaphysical character, which lead to think about the limits of this discipline.

Palavras-chave : Intentionality; intentional act; conscience; inteligible object; representation.

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